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Along with the European Union’s economic and 
juridical agenda, a whole series of so-called
‘cultural’ policies have been implemented,1 in-
cluding the European Union emblem and flag 
which appears nowadays on all public buildings 
and offices; the European anthem, the “Ode
to Joy”, taken from Beethoven’s Ninth Sym-
phony as best capturing the European idea; 
the “European city of culture”; EU-sponsored
sporting, writing and other competitions and 
awards; the establishment of the “Women of 
Europe” awards; the designation of “Europe 
Day” on May 9, the date of the Schumann
Declaration which led to the creation of the
European Coal and Steel Community; educa-
tional exchange programs such as Erasmus, 
Socrates, and Leonardo; and town twinning
– to name but a few!2 The goal of such top-
down strategies is to promote Europeans’ 
consciousness of their ‘common heritage and 
identity’, and give Europe a ‘soul’ – a require-
ment recognised in Jean Monnet’s declara-
tion that “We are not forming coalitions be-
tween States but union among peoples;”3 in 
Jacques Delors’ warnings that people do not 
fall in love with a market, but need something
else;4 and finally in policymakers’ assertions 
that European citizens feel “moved on hearing 
the Ode to Joy” or “enjoy following the Euro-
pean sign in airport arrival halls, and pass-
ing through simply by showing the uniform
passport adopted in 1985”.5
Most social and political analysts of European 
politics consider these ‘Euro measures’ to be 
‘merely symbolic’, meaning of minor political 
significance (when compared to the ‘real’ eco-
nomic and legal restrictions on the movement 
of goods, funds, information and labour) and
of no sentimental value for the Europeans. As 
Eleni Papagaroufali
Of Euro-Symbols and
Euro-Sentiments:
The Case of Town
and School Twinning
Panteio University of Social and
Political Sciences
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/03/2020 06:34:43 |
HISTOREIN
V
O
L
U
M
E
 8
 (2
0
0
8
)
73
a result of this stance, there is little or no research on the small-scale civilities and the rituals or 
ceremonies involved in these symbolic measures. Also, instead of focusing on the “considerable 
effects” of such policies,6 or on the “latent legitimacy” the EU enjoys through processes of popular 
attachment to it, occurring at the level of everyday life in a myriad of ways (consumerism included),7
most analysts point to the deficiencies or contradictions of the European Commission,8 as well as 
to its disavowal of the affective, passionate and libidinal/joyful dimension of the identification proc-
ess.9 As a consequence, the Eurobarometer and similar large-scale surveys are the only sources
available to show that European citizens feel either “little” or “not at all” European, or that they con-
sider these symbolic practices of secondary importance or as purely decorative.10
The European Union’s politics of emotion
Nevertheless, a closer analysis of concrete examples reveals that EU policymakers are just as
aware as anthropologists that what is stereotypically constructed as ‘merely symbolic’ does not 
simply reflect but rather actively creates political realities due to its capacity to draw the attention 
of the public, thereby engaging people in emotional states of various kinds. Therefore, the Com-
mission’s attempts to mobilise popular support by creating public symbols for the EU should be
seen as part of a long-term, more or less explicit, “politics of emotion”,11 or of what a French co-
lonialist once called éducation du coeur.12 In this case, emotions or sentiments and sensations are
understood not as biological endowments but as cultural idioms of belonging that can be fostered 
through tropes of familial ties (for example, the “European Family”, the “European House”, “Twin-
ning”), and acquired through multisensory stimulation and training (for example, festive ceremonies 
and joyful exchanges between “twinned” town dwellers and school pupils). In fact, drawing on the
assumption that the Union’s member states share a common fate – meaning that the European 
integration project is inevitable – Commission officials consider these practices the perfect means
to construct Europeanness as an affective site of affiliation and identification; or, to make the ‘peo-
ples of Europe’ both to ‘learn to love’ European matters and be ready to defend them as ‘theirs’. It 
is worth remembering the intensive campaigns launched by the Commission during the late 1990s 
in order to convince European citizens to “learn to love” the merits of their new common currency.13
Nowadays, the extent to which this readiness to feel intimate with the imposed Other, and to de-
fend it as ‘one’s own’, may be measured by instances like the following: a 15-year Greek girl whose 
school twinned with a Turkish school in 2003, complained intensely to me that the Turkish shop
owners would not accept “euros” from their Greek customers. To my remark that “Turkey has its
own national currency” and that “it is not yet an EU member”, the schoolgirl replied scornfully that
“the longer the Turks don’t accept the euro, the farther off their integration into the EU will be!”14
The generous financial support for all kinds of sentimental training in matters European con-
cerns the Union’s ‘old’ and ‘new’ members and ‘candidate’ and ‘potential candidate’ states – the
last two categories include Turkey, Serbia, Albania and FYROM among others. Consequently, the
massive promotion of ‘merely symbolic’ policies prescribes not only who should be intimate with
whom and in what way, but also who deserves this intimacy, hence its legitimate recognition as
a member of the European Family. The Commission’s extensive “investment” in the normative
“distribution of [familial] affections” among its members,15 as well as its enormous interest in
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creating multiple microsites of intimate space – where the obligatory becomes naturalised and
pleasurable, thus fully enmeshed in its technologies of governmentality – is best exemplified by 
the institution of twinning. Twinning between European cities, towns, schools, and all sorts of lo-
cal bodies aims at making the so-called “peoples of Europe” rise above conflicts inherited from
the past while acknowledging their “cultural differences”. It is held that through this “local-level”
apprenticeship, European locals of the north, south and east will learn how to “feel like citizens
of Europe” and will actively contribute to the formation of a “new European identity”.16 Thus, twin-
ning forms a framework for national histories to get recast in a transnational, affectively appeal-
ing, common space of European citizenship.
Town twinning and the European family
The desired kind of relations between the European family members is articulated through the
kin term ‘brothers’ and, more exactly, ‘twins’ – since most member states have adopted the term 
“twinning” in their own language.17 The banality of the term (brotherhood(s), brotherlike alliances, 
etc.) and its age-old performative reiteration for the establishment of connective narratives and
reconciliation between actual and potential enemies,18 present us with interesting points. On the 
one hand, they remind us that “sovereignty continues to draw life from the family”,19 namely the 
ideal of disinterested and connective, conjugal, parental, brotherly, kin love. “Regulating the inti-
mate and ‘policing the family’” between colonisers and the colonised have always been the pri-
mary reformist practices by which Western and Eastern (neo-)colonial forms of governance were 
more or less secured and worked out.20 By the same token, the language of familial, enduring 
affection and the creation of fraternal bonds have been defining features of national states.21 On 
the other hand, the imperative to reiterate kin metaphors reaffirms that expansive projects such 
as European integration can never be fully complete, and shows the planners’ (at least partial) 
awareness of their projects’ vulnerability. For instance, town-twinning aims at bringing togeth-
er ‘peoples’ who are not merely ‘culturally different’ but have been, or still feel, inimical to each 
other – for example, the French, the Polish and the Germans, the Israelis and the Palestinians,
the Greeks and the Turks, etc. In such cases, twinners hope for “the [mutual] acknowledgment
rather than the solution of the pain” suffered in the past or nowadays.22 Yet, the extent to which 
old wounds may have been “forgiven” but not “forgotten”,23 and hence whether the pain will be 
mutually acknowledged, are difficult questions that might lead to unhappy answers.
All these inherent difficulties notwithstanding, the term ‘twinning’, combined with the naturalised 
terms ‘local(s)’ and ‘people(s)’, renders the image of a large ‘European’ family intelligible and in-
timate to European audiences – to paraphrase Cris Shore, the “European family” campaign (like
the “European citizenship” one) “makes the EU more visible to its newly constituted subjects so
that they see themselves reflected in its largess”.24 Despite its banality, or thanks to it, the con-
stant reiteration of the ‘family’ by Union officials denotes the latter’s performative force owed to 
its supposedly “fundamental” traits: “the self-governing couplet of ‘I-Thou’”, which becomes “One” 
through the “intimate event [of love]”; and “the unity of ‘We [-as-One]’”, this metaphysical, yet well-
rooted and house-kept “idyllic bond” that “unfolds out of this couplet, followed in turn by various 
levels of social organisation – say, our ‘family’, ‘nation’, ‘race’, ‘culture’, ‘religion’”.25 That Union 
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officials are not satisfied with the idea of mere ‘brotherhoods’ but opt for ‘multiple twinnings’
between local bodies denotes their expectation that EU partners interact at the ‘local’, meaning
‘small-scale’, ‘family’ level, so that they learn to feel not merely as ‘brothers’ but if possible as
“twins” – the master metaphor of the Same. Given their awareness that the European family is
still under construction, they finance what Hannah Arendt would call a “gigantic [supra-] nation-
wide administration of housekeeping”,26 or what Elizabeth Povinelli aptly calls a (neo-) liberal form
of “oikopolitics”,27 that is, practices of pedagogical-disciplinary care that are based at the values
of the global market but are applied on the “intimate” level. Central to the oikopolitical nature of
the nearly 30,000 twinning links is the notion of love in its symbolic, hence normative, version: it
is performed as a Foucaultian regulatory ideal, namely as a set of regulatory practices aiming at
administering the forms of intimacy considered ‘appropriate’ among those who wish to acquire
and maintain the identity of the European family ‘member’. Thus, it is not only ‘joy’ that should be
felt in a certain European (Beethoven “Ode to Joy”) way; mutual ‘love’ should also have a certain
expression, that of ‘we-as-one’ in its brotherly or twinned version. As a consequence, the main
twinning activities (exchange of visits and gifts, dancing and singing, planning and implement-
ing agro-tourist partnerships, hosting partners’ children during the summer, etc.) presuppose
the notion of mutual rights and duties – as if the old, new, and accession members were family.
Twinned European citizens are financed to visit their partners’ places in order to get to know and
acknowledge each other’s different cultures and local histories rather than to behave as tour-
ists, i.e., just to disinterestedly observe the Other and leave. In short, twinning could be seen as
an affective cultural idiom of citizenship, one that seeks to administer internal borders and their 
historical connections to national identities in a unifying Europe.
As it will be shown below, twinning is an inherently contradictory institution (due to its normative-
regulatory nature) which affirms and simultaneously disrupts relations at the local and translocal
level. Nevertheless, it is widely welcomed by ‘local peoples’ throughout the EU, including Greece.
The Commission’s financial support is certainly quite appealing, but people’s appreciation for cer-
tain partnerships plays an equally important role in twinning. So far, twinners have been totally
free to choose their partners according to their own criteria. For example, Greek municipalities
have twinned with southern Italian towns that were once ancient Greek colonies; they have also
twinned with Bulgarian, Romanian and Serbian towns with the aim of establishing economic
partnerships related to tourism; and with German, French and Belgian cities where Greeks used
to live as immigrants; as well as with Turkish municipalities where Greeks lived since ancient
times until they were expelled at the end of the Greco–Turkish War in the 1920s. 
This freedom to choose one’s own criteria not only underscores the Commission’s purpose to make 
EU-citizenship affectively appealing but fits perfectly with the central value professed by the ideal 
of love or intimacy in its (neo)liberal version: to feel intimate presupposes the freedom from social
constraints such as kinship, local tradition, national history, etc.28 Thus, despite the fact that twinning 
has substituted the (upsetting) notion of ‘freedom’ with the (levelling) idea of ‘love’, it nonetheless 
provides hundreds of thousands of total strangers with the freedom (and the means) to consent to
multiple synergies. In all these forms of “contractual freedom”,29 the metaphysical ‘We-as-One’ is 
supposed to consist of self-sovereign individuals of any age and gender who agree upon develop-
ing mutual relations of affectivity and intimacy, out of their own volition rather than out of obligato-
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ry conventions such as social status by birth, etc. Moreover, the recreational character of twinning
activities (including the economic ones) provides twins with pleasurable, even idyllic and liberating, 
experiences: Greek pupils who twin with other European schoolboys and -girls flirt with their new 
friends and keep up contact through email and text messages in the hope of meeting again; adult 
men and women who previously had never travelled abroad may find themselves enjoying new 
experiences such as travelling by airplane or reliving a second honeymoon! 
The expectation (raised both from ‘above’ and ‘below’) that twinning bonds should – by definition –
overcome not only conflicts inherited from the past but also be more than mere coalitions and “part-
nerships” between states,30 obscures whatever disagreements, rivalries and disloyalties are pending 
in the history of a community, inside it and in relation to potential twin brothers and sisters. Never-
theless, sooner or later, the performative distribution of those who are allowed to ‘love’ the Other 
symbolically (as if they were family) brings to the fore the contradictions (and exclusions) inhabiting 
this regulatory ideal: while some people exclude themselves from twinning out of disagreement 
with the institution itself or with the specific partnership-to-be, others (the majority) are excluded for 
not fulfilling the criteria of the specific twinning case. The potential or actual return of the excluded 
in order to sabotage and even determine the outcome of twinning processes reveals the limits of 
normative intimacy, namely, its constitutive dependence on both those who do not acknowledge 
it and those who are not acknowledged by it. Consequently, the festive character of twinning fails
to conceal such latent threats, or to escape the disputes that (re)surface on the occasion of twin-
ning, both among fellow citizens who pretend to live their everyday lives ‘in peace’ (like a family) 
and between citizens of member states with a peaceful or a hostile past or present. The following 
examples of twinning between Greeks and their others illustrate these remarks.
The Greek Eurothermometer
When the residents of the southeastern Attican municipality of Palaia Focea31 (Greek: Παλαιά
Φώκαια, meaning Old Focea) decided to twin with their ancient Focean ancestors’ colonies es-
tablished in Italy (Ascea Velia), Spain (Ampuria) and France (Marseille) in 600 BC, they thought
it absolutely “natural” to include in their visit exchanges only “authentic” Foceans, namely those 
who had come to this area of Greece from Asia Minor in the early 1930s as political refugees.32
Some of the excluded residents (i.e., Vlachs and Sarakatsans living in the area prior to the ar-
rival of the Focean refugees, Cypriots inhabiting the place since the Turkish invasion of Cyprus,
Greek workers originating from all over Greece, foreign immigrants) expressed indifference to-
wards twinning, whereas the majority felt annoyed by the “authentic” Foceans’ “arrogance” and 
accused them for “eating European Union money”. Moreover, the fact that “Albanian children” 
had to be included in the group of school pupils on the visit to Italy fuelled a lot of quarrels which 
only abated at the last moment through the intervention of a fervent supporter of twinning. When 
some Foceans became interested in twinning with the place of origin of their ancestors in Tur-
key, modern-day Foça, the municipality divided into a minority in support and a majority in op-
position. Most Greeks could not even think of twinning with the “enemy”, whereas Greek Cypri-
ots became furious with the “treachery” of the Foceans. Needless to say, “foreigners” (Albanians, 
Kurds, Egyptians) were never asked about this issue. 
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On their arrival to Turkish Foça (1991), Greek Foceans met with many people who “acknowl-
edged”, hence became “witnesses” of,33 their grandparents’ and parents’ painful past: with old
women and men who “knew” exactly where the Foceans’ grandparents lived and worked, and
who took guests “by the hand” to show them these places; with Turkish newcomers who now
lived in the parental houses of the Foceans and who still kept the legitimate owners’ keys by the
door; with grandchildren of Muslims who lived in Greece before 1922 (before being “exchanged”
for Christians living in Turkey) and who still spoke Greek. All of them reassured the Focean visi-
tors that their expelled forefathers used to live “like brothers” with Turkish Foceans. Nevertheless,
when these Turks first visited Palaia Focea in Greece (1993), the opponents distributed hundreds
of flyers demanding “Turks out of Focea”. In the following years, many more Foceans (includ-
ing many former opponents) visited their “lost fatherland” and met, danced, and sung with local
residents. Greek Foceans’ involvement with “the Turks” filled them with positive sentiments: “Al-
though poor, Turks are warmer and more hospitable than us and more so than the Italians and
Spanish.” However, during their second visit to Palaia Focea (2003), the Turks had to face many
unfortunate incidents (for example, when some primary schoolchildren booed the Turkish pupils
while they were singing the Turkish national anthem) which were abated at the last moment by
twinning supporters. The festive ceremonies continued ‘normally’ thanks to the assurances of
most participants that nothing wrong was going on. That the twinning between Greek, Italian and
Spanish Foceans took only three to four years to be fully and ‘officially’ complete, while the one
with the Turkish Foceans took ten whole years, is not coincidental. Most of the Old Foceans of
Greek and Cypriot origin continue to criticise this “sacrilegious act” and “feel deeply disappointed
and sad about it”. Even those Foceans who visit Turkey quite often keep questioning “the sincer-
ity of Turks’ [brotherly] feelings” and emphasise the blind spots of this Greek–Turkish twinship:
“Turks present ‘our’ ancient marbles as ‘theirs’”; in the tourist flyers, Turkish Foceans attribute
their municipality’s name, Foça, to the existence of ‘focies’ (meaning seals in Greek) rather than
to their ancient ancestors, the Focean founding fathers. And although the very same complain-
ants laugh at “the theory that we [Greek and Turkish Foceans] come from the same [Focean] ori-
gins”, they nonetheless declare their mistrust of the Turks: “They misrepresent us [Greeks/Greek
Foceans]! How is it possible then to trust them?” No matter how “official” such Greek–Turkish
twinships may be considered, it is obvious that the limits of normative intimacy are on the brink
of resurfacing at any time; as a consequence, the expected ‘completion’ of twinning can be eas-
ily deconstructed and thus deferred to the midst of the European ‘common future’.
Paradoxically, this deconstruction and/or deferral, which does not concern the ‘enemies’ exclusively 
nor is it always so explicit, is most often performed through the reiteration of a commonsensical
discourse about the supposed “warmness” and “coldness” of the sentiments felt by the twins-to-
be during their preparatory exchange of visits – perfect proof that ‘merely symbolic’ euro-policies,
such as twinning, are external neither to the ‘non-symbolic’ or the ‘real’ nor to the ‘sentimental’. For 
instance, Greek nationalist biases seem to soften (or come under strain) depending on the degree 
of warmness shown by their hosts. Thus, according to the Greek Eurothermometer, “the Spanish” 
(in particular the Catalans and the Andalusians), “the [southern] Italians”, “the Turks” and the “Bal-
kan peoples” emit the highest temperatures. Conversely, the “[western and northern] Europeans”
are classified as “gentle” but “cold”, meaning “non-hospitable”, “cheap” and “snobby”: “the Europe-
ans” tend to “observe” their Greek visitors rather than “to get to know them”. 
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Nevertheless, warm sentiments do not necessarily guarantee the inclusion of the Other in oneself,
nor the acknowledgment of the Other as ‘equal’ with oneself. The Greek high-school teachers and
students who visited a Greek-speaking town and school in Calabria (Magna Grecia, southern Italy)
in order to twin, got enthusiastic with their hosts’ “extreme warmness” which reminded them of
“the way Greeks used to behave 30 years ago”: “These people were simple and poor but very open
and hospitable.” On the day of departure, the Italians offered Greeks huge boxes full of sandwiches
and sweets to eat during their trip: “I was really moved . . . they reminded me of what Greek vil-
lagers used to do for their visitors 30 years ago.” The Italians’ Greek was “poor” – “it sounded like
Chinese” to the students – and the ancient monuments of that area were “humble and few”, fewer 
than expected to be found in a former glorious colony of ancient Greeks! Such shortcomings were
balanced, however, by the Italians’ warmth: “Their warm and loving eyes made us also see these
monuments in a different [more favourable] way.” In short, southern Italians may be warmer than
we Greeks, but they are lacking in something: they still live the way we lived 30 years ago! Or,
to use Homi Bhabha’s words, “they are almost the same [as us], but not quite”: we are 30 years
ahead!34 Greek twinners did not perceive southern Italians as “coeval”, to recall Fabian’s apt term;35
in their discourse of affection, warmness and coldness have an age status: the “warm, yet poor”
Italians, Turks and Serbians remind them of “Greece back in the ‘60s”, whereas the “coldness” of
the French, Germans, and Dutch mirrors the equally passionless behaviour contemporary Greeks
have now adopted, “but not quite”. “Unlike them, we maintain some elements of our humane na-
ture; we still feel and care for our fellow human beings.” In cases where Greek twinners feel “30
years ahead”, their “humane” character may take the form of a passionate ‘mission’. If the support
promised materialises, the twinning between Greek missionaries and the Other may last long –
at least out of gratitude; if not, it may be postponed or never completed. Some Greeks who failed
to prove that they are 30 years ahead of the Other have learned an unexpected lesson, namely 
that the Other is not external but rather internal to their own affective histories and economies of
belonging. When the Greek mayor realised that his municipality could not afford all the goods he
had promised to his “poor” Bulgarian twin partners, he refrained from offending them (for being
poor) and defending himself (for being better off): “No matter how we wish to differ from Alba-
nian immigrants, we are still Balkan.” The unpleasant discovery that both Greeks and Bulgarians
are equally deprived of the necessary means to fully prove their ‘Europeanness’ reminded him
of the ‘poor’ aspects of Greek society that have been consciously forgotten over the last 20 years
– the period when Greeks, these ex-migrants, became the nouveau-riche, European masters of
Albanian, Polish and Bulgarian migrants within their own home.
Europe for Citizens vs. Europe of Citizens
All of the above-mentioned ethnographic vignettes show that the relations between twin partners 
tend to be ephemeral, ambiguous and unstable. For the EU, ‘cultural differences’ mean versions 
of the Same – the metaphoric use of “twinning” fits perfectly with the Union’s master slogan of 
“Diversity in Unity”. For the twin partners, however, cultural differences may denote the unex-
pected self-awareness vis-à-vis the Other, capable of leaving the twinning process in suspen-
sion; or the stirring of enough ‘old wounds’ to keep twinning in perpetual postponement; or the 
thermometric classification of partners into worthy and unworthy of one’s own intimate feelings. 
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In short, regardless of how connective (and disciplinary) the Union’s éducation du coeur aims to
be, twin brothers take the liberty to make their own culturally informed, emotional judgments of
euro-symbols, thus ‘adding’ their own histories to the history of Europe, and consequently re-
vealing Europe’s chronic state of incompleteness.
This is exactly the reason why Commission officials have recently changed their policy concern-
ing twinnings: they launched a new six-year project (2007–2013) entitled “Europe for Citizens”
(instead of the previous “Europe of Citizens”), which includes civil, nongovernmental organisa-
tions in its budget.36 Feeling vulnerable after the unforeseen reactions of member states – such
as the French and Dutch vote against the proposed European Constitution – and willing to remind
Europeans of its monopoly to the “vertical topography of power”,37 the Commission not only re-
adopted a state-like paternalistic spirit (“Europe for Citizens”) but had had recourse to that part
of society (NGOs) which plays the role “of an imagined middle zone of contact or mediation be-
tween the citizen, the family and the community, on the one hand, and the state, on the other”.38
The keyword in this new protectionist program is “sustainability”, followed by “coherence”: from
now on, applicants for funding must convince the Commission that their “synergies” will be both
“socially repaying” and “lasting”. The means suggested for the fulfilment of these goals are the
“reflection”, “debate” and “dialogue” on the part of European citizens about issues concerning the
Union’s repercussions on the “national-local level”, and about “common projects widely applica-
ble on the European level”. Thematic conferences and seminars sponsored by at least three cities
and organised by experts are the main requirements for financial support. In this new project,
which privileges large-scale programmatic reflection and dialogue, the small-scale festivities
accompanying twinnings are less preferred. The officials of the Council of European Municipali-
ties and Regions have publicly opposed the new program by arguing that the “small” (implying
the ‘familial’, the ‘unofficial’, the ‘intimate’), and the “translocal” character of twinning constitute
“the most powerful and fundamental elements towards the European integration”.39
At first sight, the European Family Fathers (successors of the European Community Founding 
Fathers) seem to believe that “sustainability” can be better achieved through the faculties of rea-
son and deliberation than through the politics of emotion and affection. Should we assume that,
from now on, the Commission will make a distinction between the ‘heart’ and the ‘mind’ and will
abandon the former as more unruly than the latter? I would suggest that the Commission’s ‘ex-
pertise’ in matters European should not be underestimated: it seems to know well that so-called
‘emotions’ or ‘feelings’ (of affection/hostility) and ‘sentiments’ are not universal biological endow-
ments, but culturally informed judgments of the regulatory ideals people are asked to perform in
their everyday lives.40 Consequently, they know that ‘reflection’ and ‘dialogue’ (commonly consid-
ered to belong to the separate sphere of ‘mind’ and ‘reason’), as much as ‘emotions’ and ‘senti-
ments’ (usually seen as belonging to the sphere of the ‘heart’ and the ‘body’), are but judgments of 
value that may question more than reaffirm the ‘merely symbolic’ solidities which are constructed
by the Commissioners themselves in an effort to produce a – still elusive – “European public”, and
to endow the Union’s emerging discourses and systems of transnational governmentality with – a
still missing – “legitimacy”.41 In the case of the new program, then, it is not a matter of privileging 
either reflection or emotion but of imposing new correlations of power: contrary to the thousands 
cities, towns and schools that twin with each other across the Union’s territory, civil society or-
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ganisations are expected to be more ‘collaborative’ with the Commission, thus more controllable. 
Furthermore, contrary to the joyful celebrations performed in twinned cities, towns and villages all 
over Europe, conferences and expert seminars taking place in hotel function rooms of European 
cities are more accessible to ‘EU representatives’, hence closer to the Commission’s surveillance. 
In short, the Europeans’ éducation du coeur is subjected to more control. The change of the project’s 
title from “Europe of Citizens” to “Europe for Citizens” is not ‘merely symbolic’, and hence of minor 
political and sentimental significance. In order to be financially supported, potential twin brothers 
and sisters must convince the Commission that their new synergies will be “sustainable” and “so-
cially repaying”, and that they will contribute to the European family’s “coherence”. Now, they are 
called upon to declare their loyalty to the European Family and its Founding Fathers through the 
implementation of long-lasting and stable, rather than ephemeral, ambiguous and unstable, twin-
ning relations. In fact, they are imperatively asked to conform to an ideal emotional bond which
was already there but hidden, and which Julia Kristeva, criticising all sorts of “brotherhoods”, has 
so aptly phrased that “in order to have brothers, there must be a father”.42
The extent to which future twin brothers and sisters will adapt their judgments to the new edu-
cational system of the heart, that is, whether they will prefer the reflection-oriented and surveyed
grand synergies to the small-scale, locally performed festivities, is an interesting question. The list 
of the already approved “Conferences and Seminars of Citizens” shows that the European Family’s 
children who conformed the most to the paternalistic character of the new project are the so-called 
“new members”, especially the ones that killed their Father and looked for a better One. 
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